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Abstract
We study exchange economies in which objects are heterogeneous and indivisi-
ble, and may not be substitutes for each other. We give new equilibrium existence
results with the p-substitutability condition, under which a certain degree of com-
plementarity among objects is permitted according to the parameter vector p.
Moreover, we introduce conditions under which the contributions of objects to the
social welfare are equilibrium prices.
Keywords: Indivisibility, competitive equilibrium, gross substitutability, p-
substitutability.
1 Introduction
We study the equilibrium existence problem for exchange markets with heterogeneous
indivisible objects and preferences that are quasi-linear in money. The gross substi-
tutability (GS) condition on agents' preferences is a sucient condition for the existence
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of a competitive equilibrium and has been extensively studied in the literature.1 Kelso
and Crawford [8] prove that when all agents view objects as substitutes in the sense that
their preferences satisfy GS, a price adjustment procedure will end up at a competitive
equilibrium. In this paper, we try to extend their analysis to incorporate markets in
which objects may not be considered as substitutes by all agents with a weaker condi-
tion called p-substitutability, where a parameter vector p is employed to permit a certain
degree of complementarity among objects.
Suppose that some agent j promises to purchase any set of objects from other agents
at price level p = (pa), where pa is the minimal marginal value of object a for j. We say
that agent i's preferences are p-substitutable if, taking into account j's promise, i would
view objects as substitutes for each other. We prove that there exists a competitive
equilibrium if each agent's preferences are p-substitutable.
It should be noted that since the parameter vector p is derived from the preferences
of a certain agent j in the market, p-substitutability is an endogenous condition, and
thus, in general, cannot guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for another market.
Hence, our existence result does not contradict to the maximal domain theorem by Gul
and Stacchetti [5], which shows that if any agent's preferences fail GS, then all other
agents having GS preferences does not guarantee an equilibrium to exist. Moreover, since
agent j's preferences satisfy GS whenever j has p-substitutable preferences, our result
complements Gul and Stacchetti's theorem in the sense that the a single agent j having
GS preferences is helpful for sustaining an equilibrium by relaxing the GS restriction on
other agents' preferences.
Based on the foregoing observations, we try to further extend our analysis and give
1Related literature includes Gul and Stacchetti [5], Bevia et al.[3], Reijnierse et al. [11], Fujishige and
Yang [4], Lien and Yan [9], Milgrom and Strulovici [10], Hateld et al. [6, 7], Baldwin and Klemperer
[1, 2] and Shioura and Tamura [12], among many others.
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an existence result that can be applied to markets in which no agent has GS prefer-
ences. Suppose that the social welfare function of the market has decreasing marginal
returns and let p = (pa) be the vector consisting of objects' contributions to the social
welfare. We prove that if all agents' preferences are p-substitutable, then (i) there exists
a competitive equilibrium; and (ii) pa is the largest competitive price of object a. It is
well-known that the contribution of object a to the social welfare is greater than or equal
to any competitive price of a.2 We prove that under p-substitutability, this bound itself
is a competitive price of a.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the model and some fundamental
results in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of p-substitutability with an
illustrative example and give an existence result. We then relate the existence problem
to social welfare function and study equilibrium prices in Section 4, and conclude in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Consider an economy with a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng of agents and a nite set 
 =
fa1; : : : ; amg of heterogeneous indivisible objects. Let p = (pa) 2 Rj
j be a price vector,
where pa denotes the price of object a 2 
. We assume that agents' net utility functions
are quasilinear in prices: each agent i's utility of consuming bundle A  
 at price level
p is
ui(A; p)  vi(A)  p(A);
where vi : 2

 ! R is a valuation function satisfying vi(;) = 0 and p(A) is a shorthand forP
a2A pa. We also assume that agents are not subject to any budget constraints. Hence
2See, for example, Bevia et al. [3] and Gul and Stacchetti [5].
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such a trading economy can be simply represented by E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i.
A competitive equilibrium for economy E is a pair hp;Xi, where X = (X1; : : : ; Xn)
is an allocation of objects among agents and p 2 Rj
j is a price vector such that for all
agent i 2 N ,
Xi 2 Dvi(p)  argmax
A

ui(A; p):
In Proposition 1, we recall the standard theorem of welfare economics and include a
proof for completeness.
Proposition 1. Let hp;Xi be a competitive equilibrium for E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i. Then
(a) X is ecient;3 and
(b) for any ecient allocation Y, hp;Yi is also a competitive equilibrium for E.
Proof. Let Y =(Y1; : : : ; Yn) be an arbitrary allocation of objects among agents. Since
Xi 2 Dvi (p) for each i 2 N , we have
nX
i=1
vi(Xi) =
nX
i=1
[vi(Xi)  p(Xi)] + p(
)

nX
i=1
[vi(Yi)  p(Yi)] + p(
) =
nX
i=1
vi(Yi):
Hence X is ecient.
In case Y is ecient, the above inequality implies that for all i 2 N , vi(Xi) p(Xi) =
vi(Yi)  p(Yi) and hence Yi 2 Dvi(p).
The gross substitutability introduced by Kelso and Crawford [8] is an essential con-
dition for the analysis of equilibrium. A valuation function vi : 2

 ! R satises gross
3An allocation X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) is ecient if it maximizes the sum
P
i2N vi(Xi).
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substitutability (GS) if for any vector p 2 Rj
j, the following condition holds:
A 2 Dvi(p); p0  p) 9B 2 Dvi(p0) such that fa 2 A : p0a = pag  B: (1)
It is well-known that each GS valuation function vi : 2

 ! R has decreasing marginal
returns 4 i.e., for each object a 2 
,
A  B  
nfag ) vi(B [ fag)  vi(B)  vi(A [ fag)  vi(A):
Theorem 2 of Kelso and Crawford [8] implies that a competitive equilibrium exists when-
ever all agnets' preferences satisfy GS. A natural question is how to extend their analysis
to incorporate markets with non-GS preferences.
Gul and Stacchetti [5] address the issue and give a negative result: if any agent's
preferences violate GS, then GS preferences can be found for other agents such that
no equilibrium exists. In contrast to Gul and Stacchetti's approach, we focus on the
question of whether the GS preferences of a single agent or a group of agents can help to
sustain a competitive equilibrium. In what follows, we will rst introduce the notion of p-
substitutability to generalize GS, and then study economies in which agents' preferences
may fail GS.
3 The p-substitutability condition
Our analysis begins with an illustrative example. Consider the three-agent economy
E with 
 = fa; b; cg given in Table I. Although only agent 1's preferences satisfy GS,
the ecient allocation X1 = ;; X2 = fag; X3 = fb; cg could be supported by prices
4See Gul and Stacchetti [5] and Reijnierse et al. [? ] for details.
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pa = 16; pb = pc = 9 as a competitive equilibrium. The reason for this is that agent 1's
preferences can complement other agents' preferences such that objects are viewed as
substitutes by all agents in a certain context.
Table I
Agents' valuations
fag fbg fcg fa; bg fb; cg fa; cg fa; b; cg
v1 7 7 7 13 13 13 19
v2 16 4 4 20 7 21 25
v3 5 11 11 16 20 17 26
Suppose that agent 1 promises to buy any set of objects from other agents at the
price level pv1 = (pv1 ) 2 Rj
j, where
pv1  v1(
)  v1(
nfg)
is the minimal marginal value of object  for agent 1.5 In this case, agent i (i = 2; 3)
would act the same as an agent with the valuation function vi[p
v1 ] given by
vi[p
v1 ](A) = max fvi(B) + pv1(AnB) : B  Ag for A  
;
5Since v1 satises GS, it has decreasing marginal returns, and hence v1(
)   v1(
nfg)  v1(A)  
v1(Anfg) for all objects  and all bundles A for which  2 A  
.
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and thus leading to the economy E 0 = h
; v1; v2[pv1 ]; v3[pv1 ]i given in Table II.
Table II
Agents' valuations
fag fbg fcg fa; bg fb; cg fa; cg fa; b; cg
v1 7 7 7 13 13 13 19
v2[p
v1 ] 16 6 6 22 12 22 28
v3[p
v1 ] 6 11 11 17 20 17 26
We rst note that all agents in enonomy E 0 have GS preferences, it follows that
there exists a competitive equilibrium hp;X1; X2; X3i for E 0. Then, by denition, we can
choose Yi  Xi such that vi[pv1 ](Xi) = vi(Yi)+pv1(XinYi) and verify that Yi 2 Dvi(p) for
i = 2; 3. It is not dicult to check X1 [ (X2nY2) [ (X3nY3) 2 Dv1(p). Hence, we obtain
that there is a competitive equilibrium hp;X1 [ (X2nY2) [ (X3nY3); Y2; Y3i for E .
We now introduce the notion of p-substitutability, and study its relation to GS. The
marginal vector of a valuation function vi : 2

 ! R is the vector pvi = (pvia ) 2 Rj
j given
by
pvia = vi(
)  vi(
nfag) for a 2 
:
For any vector p 2 Rj
j, the valuation function vi is called p-substitutable if the function
vi[p] : 2

 ! R given by
vi[p](A) = max fvi(B) + p(AnB) : B  Ag for A  

satises GS. By denition, it is clear that vi[p
vi ](A) = vi(A) for all A  
. Hence, vi is
pvi-substitutable if and only if vi satises GS.
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Proposition 2. Let p 2 Rj
j and let vi : 2
 ! R be a valuation function.
(a) If vi satises GS, then vi is p-substitutable.
(b) Let p0 2 Rj
j be a vector such that p0  p. If vi is p-substitutable, then vi is also
p0-substitutable.
Proof. (a) Assume that vi satises GS. Let vj : 2

 ! R be the function given by
vj(A) = p(A) for A  
 and let C = fi; jg. Suppose, to the contrary, that vi[p] fails
GS. Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti [5] implies that there exists GS valuation functions
v2; : : : ; vr such that the economy E = h
; vi[p]; v2; : : : ; vri has no equilibrium. However,
we are going to show that there exists an equilibrium for E , yielding a contradiction.
Note that each agent's preferences in the economy E 0 = h
; vi; vj; v2; : : : ; vri satisfy
GS. Hence there exist an allocation (Xi; Xj; X2; : : : ; Xr) and an equilibrium price vector
q 2 Rj
j such that Xi 2 Dvi(q); Xj 2 Dvj(q) and Xk 2 Dvk(q) for k = 2; : : : ; r. For any
Y  
, there exists A  Y such that vi[p] = vi(A) + p(Y nA) and hence
vi[p](Xi [Xj)  q(Xi [Xj) = [vi(Xi)  q(Xi)] + [vj(Xj)  q(Xj)]
 [vi(A)  q(A)] + [vj(Y nA)  q(Y nA)]
= vi[p](Y )  q(Y ):
This implies that hq;Xi [Xj; X2; : : : ; Xri is a competitive equilibrium for E .
(b) Assume that vi is p-substitutable. This implies that vi[p] is GS, and so is (vi[p])[p
0].
It suces to prove that vi[p
0] coincides with (vi[p])[p0]. Let A  
 be an arbitrary
bundle of objects. By denition, there exist two subsets B and B0 of A such that
vi[p
0](A) = vi(B) + p0(AnB) and (vi[p])[p0](A) = vi[p](B0) + p0(AnB0). Similarly, there
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exists C 0  B0 such that vi[p](B0) = vi(C 0) + p(B0nC 0). Since p0  p, we have
vi[p
0](A) = vi(B) + p0(AnB)  vi[p](B) + p0(AnB)  (vi[p])[p0](A)
= vi[p](B
0) + p0(AnB0) = vi(C 0) + p(B0nC 0) + p0(AnB0)
 vi(C 0) + p0(AnC 0)  vi[p0](A):
This implies vi[p
0](A) = (vi[p])[p0](A) and completes the proof.
The following result shows that pv1-substitutability is sucient for the existence of a
competitive equilibrium whenever v1 satises GS.
Theorem 1. Let E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i be an economy. Assume that v1 satises GS. If
each agent's valuation function vi satises p
v1-substitutability, then E has a competitive
equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let E = h
; v1; : : : ; vni be an economy. Assume that v1 has decreasing
marginal returns and that there exists a competitive equilibrium hp;Xi for the economy
E 0 = h
; v1; v2[pv1 ]; : : : ; vn[pv1 ]i. Then there exists Yi  Xi for i = 2; : : : ; n such that
Y1 [ (
Sn
i=2(XinYi)) 2 Dv1(p), and Yi 2 Dvi(p) for i = 2; : : : ; n.
Proof. We rst note that pv1a  pa for all a 2 
nX1. In case pv1a > pa for some a 2 
nX1,
since v1 has decreasing marginal returns, it follows that
v1(X1 [ fag)  p(X1 [ fag) = [v1(X1 [ fag)  v1(X1)  pv1a ] + [pv1a   pa]
+ [v1(X1)  p(X1)] > v1(X1)  p(X1);
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contradicting to the fact X1 2 Dv1(p).
For i = 2; : : : ; n, there exists Yi  Xi such that vi[pv1 ](Xi) = vi(Yi)+ pv1(XinYi), and
hence
vi[p
v1 ](Yi)  p(Yi)  vi[pv1 ](Xi)  p(Xi)
 [vi(Yi)  p(Yi)] + [pv1(XinYi)  p(XinYi)]
 vi(Yi)  p(Yi)  vi[pv1 ](Yi)  p(Yi):
This implies
Pn
i=1[p
v1(XinYi)  p(XinYi)] = 0 and vi(Yi)  p(Yi) = vi[pv1 ](Xi)  p(Xi) 
vi[p
v1 ](A)  p(A)  vi(A)  p(A) for i = 2; : : : ; n and for all A  
. Moreover, since
v1(Y1)  p(Y1)  v1(Y1 [ (
n[
i=2
(XinYi)))  p(Y1 [ (
n[
i=2
(XinYi)))
 v1(Y1)  p(Y1) +
nX
i=1
[pv1(XinYi)  p(XinYi)]  v1(Y1)  p(Y1);
we have Y1 [ (
Sn
i=2(XinYi)) 2 Dv1(p).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that vi satises p
v1-substitutability for i = 1; : : : ; n. This
implies each agent in E 0 has GS valuation function, and hence there exists an equilibrium
for E 0. Moreover, since each GS valuation function has decreasing marginal returns and
so does v1, it follows that E has a competitive equilibrium by Lemma 1.
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4 Markets with non-GS preferences
In this section, we will extend our analysis to study economies in which no agent has GS
preferences with the notion of aggregate valuation function. For each coalition of agents
C  N , the corresponding aggregate valuation function vC : 2
 ! R is dened by
vC(A) = max
(X
i2C
vi(Ai) :
[
i2C
Ai = A and Ai \ Aj = ; for i 6= j
)
for A  
:
In particular, we call vN the social welfare function of the economy E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i.
The following result shows that when the aggregate valuation function of some coali-
tion C has decreasing marginal returns, pvC -substitutability is sucient for an equilib-
rium to exist.
Theorem 2. Let E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i be an economy. Assume that there exists a coalition
C  N such that vC has decreasing marginal returns. If each agent's valuation function
vi satises p
vC -substitutability, then
(a) there exists a competitive equilibrium; and
(b) the social welfare function vN satises GS.
To illustrate the impact of Theorem 2, we consider the three-agent economy given in
Table III. Note that each agent's preferences violate GS but satisfy pvN -substitutability.
Since the social welfare function vN has decreasing marginal returns, it follows that the
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market has an equilibrium by Theorem 2.
Table III
Agents' valuations
fag fbg fcg fa; bg fb; cg fa; cg fa; b; cg
v1 7 3 3 8 7 8 13
v2 7 7 7 8 8 8 12
v3 3 3 7 7 8 8 13
vN 7 7 7 14 14 14 21
Let p 2 Rj
j be the vector given by pa = pb = pc = 4 and let X1 = fag; X2 = fbg; X3 =
fcg. It can be veried that hp;Xi is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that vi satises p
vC -substitutability for i = 1; : : : ; n.
(a) Let E 0 = h
; v0; v1; : : : ; vni be the economy constructed from E by adding an
agent 0 with the valuation function v0 given by v0(A) = p
vC (A) for A  
. Since v0
satises GS and pv0 = pvC , the result of Theorem 1 implies that there exists a competitive
equilibrium hp;X0; X1; : : : ; Xni for E 0.
Note that in case X0 = ;, hp;X1; : : : ; Xni is a competitive equilibrium for E and we
have done. Suppose X0 = fa1; : : : ; arg 6= ;. Let A0 = [i2CXi and let Aj = Aj 1 [ fajg
for j = 1; : : : ; r. Since vC has decreasing marginal returns, we have
vC(Aj)  vC(Aj 1)  pvCaj for j = 1; : : : ; r;
and vC(Ar)   vC(A0)  pvC (X0) = v0(X0). Let X 00 = ;; X 0i = Xi for i 2 NnC, and let
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fX 0igi2C be a partition of Ar such that vC(Ar) =
P
i2C vi(X
0
i). It follows that
nX
i=0
vi(Xi) 
nX
i=0
vi(X
0
i) = vC(Ar) +
X
i2NnC
vi(Xi)
 v0(X0) + vC(A0) +
X
i2NnC
vi(Xi) 
nX
i=0
vi(Xi):
This impliesX 00; X
0
1; : : : ; X
0
ni is an ecient allocation for E 0, i.e.,
Pn
i=0 vi(Xi) =
Pn
i=0 vi(X
0
i).
By Proposition 1, hp;X 00; X 01; : : : ; X 0ni is a competitive equilibrium for E 0, and hence
hp;X 01; : : : ; X 0ni is a competitive equilibrium for E .
(b) Suppose, to the contrary, that vN violates gross substitutability. By Theorem
2 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999), there exists a GS valuation function vn+1; : : : ; vn+r
such that there is the economy h
; vN ; vn+1; : : : ; vn+ri has no competitive equilibrium.
However, the result of (a) implies that there exists an equilibrium hp;X1; : : : ; Xn+ri for
the economy h
; v1; : : : ; vn; vn+ri. Let XN = [i2NXi. It is not dicult to check that
hp;XN ; Xn+1; : : : ; Xn+ri is an equilibrium for h
; vN ; vn+1; : : : ; vn+ri, yielding a contra-
diction.
It is well-known that in equilibrium, the competitive price of object a 2 
 is less than
or equal to pvNa  vN(
)  vN(
nfag), i.e., the contribution of a to the social welfare. A
proof by Bevia et al. [3] is included for completeness.
Proposition 3 (See Bevia et al. [3]). Let hp;Xi be a competitive equilibrium for E =
h
; (vi; i 2 N)i. Then pvN  p.
Proof. Let a 2 
 and let (Y1; : : : ; Yn) be a partition of 
nfag such that
Pn
i=1 vi(Yi) =
13
vN(
nfag). Since X is ecient and Xi 2 Dvi(p) for i = 1; : : : ; n, it follows that
vN(
)  p(
) =
nX
i=1
[vi(Xi)  p(Xi)]

nX
i=1
[vi(Yi)  p(Xi)] = vN(
nfag)  p(
nfag):
This implies pvNa = vN(
)  vN(
nfag)  pa.
Following the above observation, Bevia et al. [3] and Gul and Stacchetti [5] study
the question of under which conditions an ecient allocation can be supported by pvN
as an equilibrium. In the following result, we try to generalize their results with pvN -
substitutability.
Theorem 3. Let E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i be an economy. Assume that the social welfare
function vN has decreasing marginal returns. If each agent's valuation function vi sat-
ises pvN -substitutability, then for any ecient allocation X, hpvN ;Xi is a competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the economy E 0 = h
; v0; v1; : : : ; vni where v0 is the valuation function
given by v0(A) = p
vN (A) for A  
 and let N 0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng. The result of Theorem
1 implies that there is a competitive equilibrium hp;Y0; Y1; : : : ; Yni for E 0. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that Y0 = fa1; : : : ; arg. Let A0 = [ni=1Yi and let
Aj = Aj 1 [ fajg for j = 1; : : : ; r. Morover, since vN has decreasing marginal returns,
we have
vN(
)  vN(A0) =
rX
j=1
[vN(Aj)  vN(Aj 1)]
 pvN (Y0) = v0(Y0):
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This implies vN(
)  v0(Y0)+vN(A0)  v0(Y0)+
Pn
i=1 vi(Yi) = vN 0(
)  v0(;)+vN(
) =
vN(
), and we have vN(
) = vN 0(
). Let (X1; : : : ; Xn) be an arbitrary partition of

 such that
Pn
i=1 vi(Xi) = vN(
) = vN 0(
) and let X0 = ;. By Proposition 1, we
have that hp;X0; X1; : : : ; Xni is also a competitive equilibrium for E 0. This implies that
hp;X1; : : : ; XNi is a competitive equilibrium for E and for each a 2 
,
v0(;)  p(;) = 0  v0(fag)  pa = pvNa   pa:
Together with the fact pvNa  pa by Proposition 3, we obtain that pvN = p.
5 Concluding remarks
In contrast to our approach, Sun and Yang [13] and Teytelboym [14] extend the GS
framework of Kelso and Crawford, and study the eect of complementarity on equilib-
rium results under the assumption that objects can be partitioned into dierent groups
and agents' preferences are alike in the way that they all view objects in the same group
as substitutes and objects across dierent groups as complements. In this paper, we in-
troduce the notion of p-substitutability to permit complex types of complementarity, and
give equilibrium results which can be applied to markets with agents having divergent
preferences.
Hateld et al. [6] address a model of trading networks which incorporates economies
with indivisible objects as special cases, and prove that a number results from the ex-
change economy model continue to hold in their network model under the full substi-
tutability condition. The question of generalizing the notion of p-substitutability to the
network model might bring signicant contribution to the matching literature, and is
15
left for further work.
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